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Section I Introduction
In September of 2001, the United States endured one of the most catastrophic events in the nation's history. These terrorist attacks sent a shockwave throughout the entire world. The United States found itself facing a challenging type of enemy: terrorists. Once combat operations began in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. detained many individuals for interrogation and held them indefinitely if they continued to pose a risk to the United States or the rest of the world. The fundamental reason for detaining these individuals was to keep them from rejoining the fight. As such, the U.S. chose to create a detention facility at the Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By June of 2002, the U.S. had transferred over 500 Taliban and al Qaida fighters to Guantanamo Bay. 1 As of December of 2008, that number had decreased to approximately 250 detainees to include 15 "high-value" detainees. 2 Throughout the last six years of operation, Guantanamo Bay has faced endless criticism from the international community and from home. Most criticized is the legal "black hole" that exists at Guantanamo Bay and concern over interrogation techniques and torture. In the latter years of his presidency, George W. Bush stated his desire to eventually close the detention facility. In addition, both presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama pledged to close the facility if elected. After winning the election, President Barack Obama stated that closing Guantanamo Bay was a top priority for his administration. 3 Obviously, this initiative will please many and upset others. However, should the U.S. close Guantanamo Bay? If so, what will the U.S. do with the remaining detainees? What are the alternatives to detention at Guantanamo Bay? These critical questions require a thorough analysis.
It is easy to claim that Guantanamo Bay should close its cells forever. After all, it created endless controversy and continues damaging the reputation of the United States throughout the international community. Does the facility create this unfavorable stigma? Alternatively, is the underlying problem the way in which the United States handled these detainees from the start?
Perhaps the process needs attention and not the fact that the detainees are isolated on a Caribbean island. The primary concern of Guantanamo Bay is the legal vacuum that exists. The process by which the U.S. determined the detention status of detainees and the policy and procedures used to continue their detention is the culprit. President Obama must quickly address this problem and revamp these processes to ensure the United States can create a new honorable and moral standard for the remainder of the Global War on Terrorism.
Detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay continue to cast a dark cloud over the United
States and its pursuit in the Global War on Terrorism. Using the problem/solution method of research, this paper will discuss the argument surrounding the detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay. It will first consider the background on Guantanamo Bay by discussing the history of the classification of detainees, the reason for choosing Guantanamo Bay, and the current legal process used for the detainees. Next, it will examine the arguments for both closing Guantanamo
Bay down and keeping it open. It will then evaluate some alternatives to Guantanamo Bay.
Finally, it will conclude with recommendations for solving these issues at Guantanamo Bay.
President Obama should not close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. The problem is not the location of the detention facility. Given the amount of resources expended to develop this facility, it would not be to simply shut it down and walk away. The problem began with the Bush administration's failure to prepare for the detainment of those individuals capture during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This lack of preparation combined with the adhoc nature in which the administration created policy and procedures for detainees is the true source of the last six years of controversy. To make detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay fair, legal and morally adequate, the Obama administration must revise the current policy and procedures. Only then can Guantanamo Bay continue to operate in a manner acceptable to the U.S. and the international community.
Section II Why Guantanamo Bay? Why Guantanamo Bay Was Chosen
Situated in the Caribbean in the southeastern tip of Cuba is Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
The United States began leasing this area back in 1903 making it the oldest overseas U.S. Navy base. 4 In the early 1990s, Haitian and Cuban migrants overran the base. During this period, the base constructed the now infamous Camp X-Ray as a temporary holding facility for these migrants. By the end of the decade, the base released the migrants and only held Chinese migrants intercepted while trying to sneak into the U.S. 5 In January of 2002, United States Southern Command received orders to take custody of detainees picked up during military operations in Central Command and hold them at Guantanamo Bay for detention and further disposition. 6 Guantanamo Bay allowed the U.S. an area to establish a detention facility in a secure and isolated location eliminating any chance the detainees would rejoin the fight. In addition, Guantanamo Bay allowed the U.S. to avoid bringing those individuals suspected of terrorism from entering domestic soil. Camp X-Ray was the only remaining facility from the 1990s migrations and used as a temporary holding facility for detainees brought to Guantanamo
Bay. Thus, began the history of detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay. Immediately there was concern over the conditions at Camp X-Ray. In January of 2004, the Red Cross visited Camp XRay to evaluate the conditions at the facility. 7 It was determined that the detainees were well fed, provided correct dietary meals, and given access to shower and toilet facilities. 8 The United States never formally declared war after the attacks of September 11, 2001 .
How could it have declared war? When the Bush administration began military operations following 9/11, it named terrorism as the enemy. As such, the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
began. Throughout history, the U.S. has fought against a specified enemy. Whether it was the German armies or the Vietcong, the U.S. knew precisely who its enemy was. Today, we fight against a tactic, not an identifiable enemy. Webster's online dictionary defines terrorism as "the systematic use of violence as a means to intimidate or coerce societies or governments".
However, concerns came flooding in once pictures surfaced illustrating the mistreatment and abuse of some detainees at Camp X-Ray by military guards. This resulted in an international outcry to examine and address the conditions of detention at Guantanamo Bay. It is here that the world began discovering the reasons behind why the U.S. chose Guantanamo Bay. 9 It becomes immediately obvious that classifying individuals suspected of terrorism is a difficult challenge at best. Therefore, the President, using his constitutional authority, issued a military order to authorize detention, treatment, and trial of non-citizens during the GWOT campaign.
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A leaked classified report, prepared by the Department of Defense, offers insight as to why Guantanamo Bay became the choice for detainee operations. The report claimed that Guantanamo Bay offered the Bush administration certain legal "advantages" because its location fell outside of U.S. court jurisdiction. 11 This offered the U.S. the ability to detain individuals and conduct interrogations with minimal influence of U.S. legal policy and procedures. However, this murky situation created dissent among many across the international community as the legal black hole at Guantanamo Bay took hold. Understanding this controversy requires a discussion of the background and evolution of the classification of the detainees.
History of the Classification, Policy, and Procedures for Detainees
One of the most significant factors contributing to the legal vacuum at Guantanamo Bay is the classification of the detainees. This had been a constant source of controversy and confusion on behalf of the Bush administration. Originally, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld identified the detainees as "unlawful combatants" with no rights under the Geneva
Conventions. 12 However, Rumsfeld indicated that the U.S. would treat detainees consistent with the Geneva Conventions. By taking this approach, the Bush administration claimed that these individuals are unlawful combatants and not military soldiers. This distinction is important because it allowed the U.S. to hold detainees for the duration of hostilities during the GWOT while also denying them prisoner of war status since that is only offered to lawful combatants. 13 Finally, this allowed the U.S. to prosecute the detainees for not only war crimes, but also for ordinary military action since they are not given combatants privilege. 14 and Administrative Review Boards (ARB). The three-person CSRT panel would listen to evidence on each detainee and determine whether the detainee meets the criteria of an enemy combatant. 21 OARDEC conducted CSRTs on all detainees with the exception of the fourteen "high-value detainees." Thirty-eight detainees failed to meet the criteria for enemy combatants and 23 of them were transferred back to their home states. 22 In 2007, the fourteen "high-value detainees" went through the CSRT process and deemed enemy combatants and of those individuals, only one went through the military commissions process. 23 Once designated as an enemy combatant, the detainee then faced an annual ARB to review the evidence against him.
Specifically, the ARB reviews the evidence to determine if the detainee still poses a threat to the U.S. or its friends and allies. In addition, the ARB determines whether the detainee is of continued intelligence value. The first round of ARBs resulted in the release of 14 detainees, transfer of 120 detainees, and continued detention for 329 detainees. By sneaking this last item of legislation, the Bush administration was able to sidestep the mechanism for detainee due process. 26 Finally, this bill created the definition of an unlawful enemy combatant: "a person who has engaged in hostilities or has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the U.S. or is co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaida, or associated forces); or a person who has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a CSRT or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense". 27 Once again, the Guantanamo black hole resurfaces and holds steady until another Supreme Court ruling. was the right approach all along even in the face of all the adversity and legal battles. 31 This history of problems with Guantanamo Bay supports the years of dissenting opinion and leads many more to believe that the time to close it down is here. As President Bush claimed, it is not as easy as it appears. In order to determine if Guantanamo Bay requires closing, it is important to understand the arguments for and against this way ahead.
Section III Should it Stay or Should it Go? Keeping it Open
Many people throughout the world believe that Guantanamo Bay is succeeding in its intended purpose. It is keeping captured terrorists suspects from harming anyone and deterring others from committing acts of terrorism. Of course, others feel it is a torturous and inhumane
prison. There is no question controversy has and will continue to surround the detention facility.
For the past six years, the entire world has debated the value and morality of detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. On 22 January 2009, after only two days in office, President Obama upheld his campaign promise and ordered Guantanamo Bay closed. Specifically, he ordered the closure of the facility within one year, prohibited the CIA from using banned interrogation techniques, and suspended tribunals until a task force reviews and corrects the legal processes. 32 In addition, President Obama has tasked his administration to examine the feasibility of moving detainees to military prisons in Kansas, California, and South Carolina or the civilian "Supermax" prison in Colorado. 33 First, it is important to remember that there are roughly 250 detainees still residing at (JTF-GTMO) houses their electronic monitoring equipment. 37 Annually, the government spends an estimated $125 million in operating costs. 38 Finally, Guantanamo Bay has a medical facility with a staff of more than 100 personnel, up to 30 inpatient beds, a physical-therapy area, pharmacy, radiology department, central sterilization area, and a single-bed operating room. 39 Another popular argument for leaving Guantanamo Bay open is that merely closing the prison will not guarantee a change in world opinion. Most likely, criticism will follow Guantanamo Bay to its next home of record. While many claim detainee abuse and poor living conditions, the fact is that these same people are going to believe these conditions will exist
anywhere. Former Vice President Cheney offered, "My own personal view is that those who are These figures may seem extraordinary, but the key point is that it will probably cost this much or more to establish comparable new facilities in the U.S. to accommodate the remaining detainees.
In addition, what expense comes with transferring them to any of these locations? Why spend this amount of money again, rather than keep the current facilities in operation? It clearly does not pass the common sense test.
most urgently advocating that we shut down Guantanamo Bay probably don't agree with our policies anyway." 40 Senator Lindsey Graham also stated, "I would like every terrorist wannabe to understand that if you take up arms against us or coalition members, you do so at your own peril, because a couple of things await you, death or injury on the battlefield, or detention and accountability." 41 Another concern for the anti-Guantanamo Bay protesters is the legal rights and due process afforded the detainees. These people believe that in order to give detainees a fair trial using untainted evidence, all legal processed must occur in the U.S. judicial system. In actuality, Guantanamo Bay will not gain any more legal sufficiency by moving to the U.S. than it currently has. As reviewed earlier, there were errors executive decision making throughout the history of Guantanamo Bay with regard to detainee classification and military tribunals. Those issues indeed require correction. However, correcting the legal complications does not require the detainees to move anywhere. Once revamped, the detainees can enjoy their due process in the U.S. legal system while remaining detained at Guantanamo Bay. The government can simply transport the detainee to any trial appearances on an as-needed basis. Moving the detainees will not necessarily give them more rights.
These are solid perspectives surrounding the need to keep the prison open.
People that hated it before will hate it as long as Guantanamo Bay or its successor exists.
Moreover, by virtue of the isolated nature of Guantanamo Bay, it serves as a warning sign for those considering terrorist action against us. Housing the detainees in the U.S. may seem like a moral victory to human rights activists, but it will place suspected terrorists on the soil of the very country they intend to harm. 43 It appears that while the country felt Barack Obama was the best candidate for President, they were not as excited about closing Guantanamo Bay. Perhaps they fear having these suspected terrorists right in their backyard. Perhaps they fear the possibility of detainees getting released in the U.S. and committing acts of terrorism as soon as they are set free. They have reason for their concern. According to the Pentagon, 61 former detainees from Guantanamo Bay allegedly returned to terrorism after their release. 44 The Pentagon confirmed that 18 detainees returned to the fight while they suspect 43 other have as well. 45 Given these statistics, the American public may feel it is too risky to bring detainees to our soil. If America suffered an attack from suspected terrorists set free in the U.S. after moving here from Guantanamo Bay, repairing our image in the world will be the least of our worries.
Closing it Down
Like any controversial issue, there are also arguments on the side of the opposition.
Guantanamo Bay is the proverbial elephant in the room. Many activist and human rights groups around the world spent the last six years protesting the Bush administration's policy and actions regarding detainee operations. Some argue simply to do so and others have reasonable arguments. While there are countless areas of concern according to these different groups, there are three common arguments around the world for closing down the operation. The first main argument comes from the legal black hole that exists at Guantanamo Bay. As mentioned earlier, the Bush administration began this detention operation without a thorough understanding of how to treat detainees under the Geneva Conventions and with regard to legal due process.
Originally, the U.S. did not recognize the Taliban or al Qaida as falling under the protection of the Geneva Conventions. Eventually, Bush declared that Taliban fighters were eligible for these protections, but still withheld them from al Qaida. 46 Subsequently, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in July 2006 declaring al Qaida eligible for the application of the Geneva Conventions. 47 Up until these accommodations, detainees were without POW status.
Although the U.S. eventually resolved these issues, there remained a legal vacuum for the detainees. As mentioned earlier, the Bush administration faced legal battles on behalf of certain detainees. 52 This group also found evidence that detainees were subjected to stress positions, often for prolonged periods. 53 These are but a few accounts from one of many organizations across the globe that believe detainees suffered abuse routinely throughout their internment. Unfortunately, the former Vice President recently substantiated these arguments by claiming that waterboarding is an acceptable interrogation technique to coerce information from detainees. He specifically mentioned his approval of this method on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind behind the September 11 th attacks against the U.S. 54 This statement only preaches to the choir of individuals outraged at the thought of the U.S. abusing and torturing detainees. By failing to take the moral high road, the U.S. is weakening its influence and effectives throughout the international community. President Obama shared this sentiment and made the closing of Guantanamo Bay one of his top priorities. He considered the impression that the U.S.
currently has in the world and addressed it in his executive order to close Guantanamo Bay.
Specifically, the order states, "In view of the significant concerns raised by these detentions, both within the United States and internationally, prompt and appropriate disposition of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo and closure of the facilities in which they are detained would further the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice." 56 Perhaps Obama's swift action to close Guantanamo Bay within one week of his presidency will send a positive message to those around the world that America can right its perceived wrong and find its way back to the top of the international community.
Section IV The Next Step
According to President Obama's executive order, Guantanamo Bay will close within a year and remaining detainees will be returned to their home country, transferred to a third country, transferred to a detention facility in the U.S., or released. 57 He guaranteed the detainee's right to habeas corpus, directed a review of the factual evidence to determine which detainees to prosecute, release, or continue to detain, and directed a review of the legal processes for detainees. detainees falling into this category. 60 The U.S. must review the evidence and condition of detention for each of these detainees to ensure they belong in this category. This category should include only those detainees of whom the government has evidence confirming they have committed or sponsored acts of terrorism. The second category includes those detainees already designated for transfer or release. Again, the U.S. must review each detainee's file to determine his eligibility for this category. There are approximately 65 to 135 detainees falling into this category. 61 For the detainees already selected for transfer, this process should occur as soon as feasible. This will take coordination between the U.S. and the home or third country, but requires swift action. Likewise, detainees designated for release should be returned as soon as accommodations can be arranged. The final category includes those detainees who are not prosecutable, but still considered too dangerous to release or transfer. Approximately 50 to 120 detainees fall into this category. 62 The U.S. should proceed with prosecution for the first category of detainees. There are several options for the U.S. to consider for this action. First, the U.S. could continue with the current military commissions. However, it is quite clear that these commissions were less than desirable. Critics feel the commissions are a "pick-up game" that allow a lower standard of evidence than admissible in normal courts and denying detainees the right to appeal their case to an independent or impartial court.
Detainees in this category are not good candidates for trial due to a lack of sufficient evidence. However, they are too dangerous to release because of their connection or participation in military operations. They are an ongoing threat to the U.S. and its allies and therefore must not return to the battlefield. Once categorized, the U.S must determine what actions to take for each category. 63 It is fair to say that unless considerably revamped, the military commissions are not the right avenue to prosecute the detainees. Another option involves the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The U.S. could modify this process and better suit it to the detainees. It would essentially work similarly to the military commissions but could offer more legitimacy in terms of evidence and due process. 64 One potential wrinkle with this plan is the impact of the Constitution's double jeopardy clause, which might prevent detainees already tried in the military commissions from facing the UCMJ. 65 It may also be difficult to prosecute al Qaida under a modified UCMJ because of their lack of military distinction, unlike the Taliban. As another option, the U.S. could establish a National Security
Court. In this option, Article III judges supervise and legitimize the detention process while the court itself offers a venue to try detainees without burdening the civilian courts with cases or potential security issues. 66 This option, however, is not a very popular one and is seen as another form of Guantanamo Bay. An American Civil Liberties Union attorney claimed, "I think creating a new alternative court system in response to the abject failure of Guantanamo would be a profound mistake. The last eight years are a testament to the problems of trying to create new systems". 67 This type of court could become an effective of means of "guaranteeing" a prosecution making just as corrupt as the reputation of the CSRTs and military commissions. A final option is to use the U.S. criminal justice system. As noted earlier, the U.S. courts have heard over 107 terrorist cases involving multiple defendants and resulting in 145 convictions versus two convictions under the military commissions. 68 This option would take detainees away from the legal "no man's land" at Guantanamo Bay and put them into a public process for the world to witness. Detainees would depart Guantanamo Bay once indicted for the U.S. This would help create transparency in the process by which the U.S. handles detainees. However, there are also obstacles with this option. One obstacle involves the logistics of housing detainees awaiting or attending trial. Another issue is convincing the American public that the detainees will not pose a security threat while held in the U.S. These trials will require sensitive information as part of the evidence, which requires appropriate protection. In addition, these trials will require substantial investigative work and will likely take up lots of time in the court system. 69 Clearly, there are pros and cons for each of the options mentioned above. The U.S.
must carefully consider each option in order to quickly and appropriately deal with the detainees in the first category. China. 70 Other countries are also afraid to accept these detainees for fear of repercussions from the Chinese. Saudi Arabia has also been a challenge for repatriation. The U.S. figured out after sending many detainees back to Saudi Arabia that they were mistreated. A State Department human rights report noted that Saudi authorities used "beatings, whippings and sleep deprivation" on detainees. 71 Finally, the State Department also found "routine" use of torture by
Yemeni security agents against detainees repatriated back to Yemen. This included threats of sexual assault and other abuse. 72 Based on these issues, repatriating and releasing detainees is a tremendous challenge. To transfer or release detainees to other countries, the U.S. must rely on the willingness of other nations to assist in the process. While many other nations criticize how the U.S. handling of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, they are not quickly volunteering to help remedy this problem. It seems hypocritical to hold such strong opposition only to withhold assistance when the U.S. began releasing and transferring detainees just as these nations asked.
Some may argue that the U.S. could release detainees within the U.S. The problem here is easy to understand: the American public. Clearly, the Obama administration has a considerable challenge in determining the proper disposition of detainees selected for transfer or release. 74 Officials are also apprehensive of having detainees in such close proximity to the surrounding community including an airport, hospitals, and farms. 75 Another popular choice for a detention facility is the U.S. Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South
Carolina. This medium-security facility has a capacity of 288 cells and has already been used to house terrorism suspects including Jose Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marril. 76 Once again, state and local officials object to moving remaining detainees to the Naval brig. Senator Lindsey
Graham and Congressman Henry Brown oppose this move because "moving terrorists to such a militarily sensitive and unprepared area would be to the detriment of the city of Charleston and surrounding communities." 77 The third most popular option includes moving detainees to Camp 82 No matter where the U.S. chooses to send detainees, the move will remain controversial. According to government officials, it is more likely that detainees the U.S. will spread detainees throughout civilian and military facilities across the U.S. in an effort to minimize the impact in any one location and making the location a less likely terrorist target. 83 Either way, the U.S. must choose quickly and begin preparing any or all of these facilities to handle the detainees.
Section V Recommendations/Conclusion
Guantanamo Bay will go down in history as one of the most controversial operations in United States history. Although the Bush administration favored the closure of Guantanamo Bay, his presidency ended with the detention facility still open and American's reputation in question. As promised throughout his campaign, President Barack Obama immediately ordered the closure of Guantanamo Bay. His attempt to "right the ship" within one year will be an enormous challenge for his administration. Likewise, it will challenge the American public as we deal with the disposition of the remaining detainees at Guantanamo Bay. In reality, the problem is not Guantanamo Bay. Human rights groups, protesters, and the media have led the world to believe that gross mistreatment and violent torture is a daily common occurrence at Guantanamo Bay. There is no doubt that occasional incidents have occurred. However, is it commonplace? There answer is no, which is why the problem is not Guantanamo Bay. The problem is the policy and procedures used during the Bush administration to handle the detainees. As discussed earlier, the Bush administration failed to plan for capturing and detaining individuals during GWOT operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The administration subsequently failed to properly classify the detainees, which led to the improvised legal procedures ultimately discrediting the grounds on which the U.S. conducted detainee operations.
To solve the problems with Guantanamo Bay and answer the question of whether or not to close it, the U.S. must change the policy and process, not the location. Therefore, Guantanamo Bay should remain open and continue to house detainees captured during the Global War on Terror.
The Obama administration, therefore, should proceed using the recommendations that follow.
Within one year, Obama directed a review of all Guantanamo Detentions, transfer and release of eligible detainees, prosecution as required, and closure of the facility. 84 This tall order requires the president to make many important decisions. First, the Obama administration must review all capture, detention, and intelligence information on each detainee. This will allow the U.S. to categorize each detainee in order to handle the disposition of each individual. The U.S.
should identify detainees as selected for prosecution, selected for transfer or release, or selected for continued detention without trial. The last category is for those detainees that cannot face a trial, but still considered too dangerous to release during the ongoing Global War on Terror.
For those detainees slated for prosecution, the Obama administration should try them in the U.S. criminal justice system. The U.S. court system has convicted 145 terrorist suspects compared with just two convictions using the military commissions. 85 The U.S. should quickly accommodate those detainees selected for transfer or release.
This will present an enormous challenge and will require solid support and cooperation from other countries throughout the world. The U.S. cannot do this alone and should not proceed further in isolation. Many detainees remaining at Guantanamo Bay face the risk of torture and abuse if sent back to their home country. In this scenario, the U.S. must depend on third-party countries to offer repatriation to these detainees. The Obama administration will need to exercise diplomatic action in order to garner support from other nations. It is imperative that the U.S. succeed in this mission in order to improve its image abroad and regain the respect of the in the U.S. court system, the U.S. should take great care in moving detainees, provide security to both the detainee and the public, and protect sensitive information used during the trial. Because detainees will remain at Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. will need to transport them to the U.S. during trial proceedings. Obviously, this requires the expense of operating a military aircraft, detention in a U.S. facility during the trial, transportation to and from courts, and a security detail to accompany the detainee or detainees.
international community. This show of commitment will restore faith in our ability to wage a responsible military campaign with respect for human rights while simultaneously securing our national interests.
Finally, President Obama should rescind the portion of his order to close Guantanamo
Bay within one year. The remainder of his executive order is appropriate and should be followed to ensure the proper classification and further disposition of the remaining detainees. However, were not designed to hold suspected terrorists. These facilities require renovation to make accommodate the detainees, interrogations, legal interviews, and classified information. The U.S. would not simply place the detainees among the prison population because of the possibility of retaliation by current inmates who may not be law abiding, but may very well be patriots and willing to avenge justice on the detainees. It does not make sense to recreate an environment that already exists in Guantanamo Bay and for which the U.S. taxpayers have supported.
Guantanamo Bay should remain open and continue serving as a detention facility for detainees. While the stigma of Guantanamo Bay will never completely disappear, the U.S. can reverse the current failed course by following these recommendations and ultimately legitimizing the plan and process by which the U.S. handles detainees. Trying prosecutable detainees in the U.S. criminal justice system that has proven the ability to prosecute terrorists will offer the world the opportunity to witness the fair and ethical treatment of detainees in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. must set and follow this standard for the remainder of the Global War on Terror and for all future irregular wars and major combat operations.
